for any rule of inference R and supposition p, (i) To know whether we can rely upon R under the supposition that p, we must know whether, if it were the case that p, R would be truth-preserving; (ii) To know whether, if it were the case that p, R would be truth-preserving, we must do some reasoning, on the supposition that p, using another rule R′ (iii) For any rule ρ, to use ρ in reasoning on the supposition that p, I must first know whether ρ is, under that supposition, reliable. I think (iii) is redundant, but let that pass. Ahmed's claim is that "each premise is either something to which everybody is committed (sceptical or not), or is not a commitment of the sceptic". As I think he realizes, my thought (and, I believe, McFetridge's) was, in effect, that the regress distinctively afflicts the sceptic because a non-sceptic can reject (ii) by maintaining that some rules are truth-preserving no matter what (i.e. under all suppositions) and can be known to be so without reasoning. Ahmed (2000, p. 84) eventually allows that a non-sceptic can evade the regress in this way, but claims that the same escape route is open to the sceptic.
If there is some method whereby we can know that [i.e. that R has a universal co-tenability range, and so is reliable in reasoning under any supposition whatever] without reasoning, then there is no basis for ruling out the view that we could come to know in the same way, for the p and R in question, that p falls within the cotenability range of R (without benefit of reasoning).
His thought seems to be that it is unnecessary, if we are to know that we can properly use R in reasoning under the supposition that p, that we should know that R has universal co-tenabilityall we need to know is that p lies within R's co-tenability range. And this, he claims, will be something we can know without reasoning, if it can be known without reasoning that R has universal co-tenability.
It is not clear that this reply, even if sound as far as it goes, is adequate to the problem. By hypothesis, p is just one supposition under which we might wish to reason, using the rule R. Thus, even assuming that the sceptic may know, without reasoning, that R is reliable in reasoning under that particular supposition, there is an obvious question concerning his entitlement to use R in reasoning under other suppositions. The sceptic appears here to be confronted with a new dilemma: either, for each other supposition q, he can know without reasoning that R is reliable in reasoning under q, or not. On the first alternative, R is reliable in reasoning under any supposition whatever, and so is a counterexample to the sceptic's thesis. On the second, there are some suppositions q such that R cannot be known without reasoning to be reliable under q. Let θ comprise all and only those suppositions for which this holds, and let ∆ be the subset of θ comprising just those suppositions r such that it can be known without reasoning that R is not reliable under r. If ∆ = θ, then if R is the rule: from Γ, infer A, then each rule of the form: from Γ ∪ {q} for q ∉ θ, infer A has universal cotenability range, and there is at least one such rule, contradicting the sceptic's thesis. If ∆ ≠ θ, then θ -∆ ≠ ∅ and for each q ∈ θ -∆, reasoning is needed to determine whether R may safely be employed under the supposition that q. In each such case, the rule R cannot be used, being still sub judice. Hence some other rule, R′, must be used. But then we confront once again the question which sends us down McFetridge's original regress: what assurance have we that R′ may safely be used in reasoning under the supposition that q?
There is, however, a much more immediate and straightforward difficulty. On the first horn of McFetridge's dilemma, the sceptic claims to be able, for some rule R, exhaustively to specify the suppositions under which R cannot be safely employed. By doing so, he plays straight into McFetridge's hands: if s* is a compendious statement of those suppositions, and R is the rule: from Γ infer A, we can easily frame a less widely applicable rule with universal co-tenability range, viz: from Γ ∪ {¬s*} infer A. The present case differs in that the sceptic does not claim to be able to specify suppositions under which R fails, much less to be able to do so exhaustively; rather, he claims to know, without reasoning, that R can be relied on, if not universally, then at least in reasoning under the particular supposition that p. But this difference makes no difference. We can still recover a restricted rule with universal co-tenability rangeif R is as above, the required rule is: from Γ ∪ {p} infer A.
The central claim of Ahmed's second objection, which concerns the argument by dilemma (Hale 1999, pp. 48-9) is that the sceptic may agree that other rules R 1 , …, R n are involved in working out the different degrees of further recalcitrance besetting the options of rejecting &E or, alternatively, rejecting R, but avoid regress and so blunt the first horn of my dilemma by denying that rejecting R 1 , rejecting R 2 , etc., are further options he needs to consider (i.e. deny the claim Ahmed labels [3]). Ahmed takes it that I would seek to block this move by arguing from:
(xi) All rules of inference are revisable in the face of recalcitrant experience; (xii) If the reliability of (Z) [i.e. the conjunction of R 1 , …, R n ] were denied then E would not be recalcitrant; (xiii) If a rule ρ is revisable in the face of recalcitrant experience and its denial would eliminate the recalcitrance of E then it is an option when faced with E to deny ρ via (xiv) (Z) is revisable … and its denial would eliminate E's recalcitrance to (xv) It is an option when faced with E to deny (Z). He objects that this involves an equivocation on "R is revisable in the face of recalcitrant experience" (p. 88). If this means "there are possible circumstances under which we would drop our belief that R is reliable" (p. 88), the sceptic must accept (xi), but can deny (xiii)"From the fact that a rule … would be dropped in the face of some recalcitrant experience, it does not follow that it is an option to drop it when faced with the present recalcitrant experience, E " (p. 88). If, instead, it means "when faced with any recalcitrant experience (with respect to R), it is an option to drop R", the sceptic must accept (xiii) but can deny (xi)"The sceptic says only that any rule … is unreliable under some circumstance. It is consistent with this that there are some circumstances under which it is reliable, and under which it is not a present option to drop it" (p. 88).
Ahmed's suggestion seems to be that I illicitly slide from the existentially to the universally quantified reading. But the matter is complicated by his own shift, in framing his two readings, between talk of what we would do (i.e. in the face of a recalcitrant experience) and talk of what it would be an option for us to do. In fact, neither of Ahmed's readings captures what I meantand what I think the sceptic should meanby saying that a statement or rule of inference is revisable in the face of recalcitrant experience. We should distinguish not merely, as Ahmed does, possible circumstances in which we would drop R from possible circumstances in which it would be an option to drop R, but both of these from possible circumstances in which we ought to drop R. In my view, what we should mean by (xi) is that for every rule R, there is some possible experience E such that, confronted with E, we ought to reject R. The sceptic with whom I was concerned should accept (xi) so understood. This sceptic does not, of course, think that whenever it is an option for us to reject R, we should do soon the contrary, he thinks that we are, in situations of recalcitrance, typically faced with several options, and that we should be guided by pragmatic considerations in deciding which to take. This sceptic can consistently hold that there are possible courses of experience in the presence of which it would be an option for us to drop R, but an option we ought not to take. The crucial question is whether he could consistently hold that there are possible courses of experiencerecalcitrant with respect to our accepted theory + logic in virtue, in part, of rule R's being included in that packagegiven which it is not merely the case that we ought not to relieve recalcitrance by rejecting R, but it would not even be an option for us to do so. It would seem that he could not. For suppose that p specifies a course of experience of the kind hypothesized, and that R is the rule: from Γ, infer A. Then denying that, given p, it is even so much as an option to reject R would be tantamount to treating the revised rule: from Γ ∪ {p}, infer A as insusceptible of revision in the face of recalcitrant experience.
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